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Abstract
We document the presence of sizable distributional e¤ects from unexpected price level
movements in the Euro Area (EA) using sectoral accounts and newly available data from
the Household Finance and Consumption Survey. The EA as a whole is a net winner of
unexpected price level increases, with Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain being the biggest
beneciaries, and Belgium and Malta being the largest losers. Governments are net winners
of ination, while the household (HH) sector is a net loser in the EA as a whole. HHs
in Belgium, Ireland, Malta and Germany incur the biggest per capita losses, while HHs in
Finland and Spain turn out to be net winners of ination. Considerable heterogeneity exists
also within the HH sector: relatively young middle class HHs are net winners of ination,
while older and richer HHs are losers. As a result, wealth inequality in the EA decreases with
unexpected ination, although in some countries (Austria, Germany and Malta) inequality
increases due to presence of relatively few young borrowing HHs. We document that HHs
ination exposure varies systematically across countries, with HHs in high ination EA
countries holding systematically lower nominal exposures.
JEL-Class. No.: E31,D31,D14
Keywords: ination, redistribution, Euro Area, household survey
1 Introduction
Unanticipated ination redistributes nominal wealth from lenders to borrowers, while unan-
ticipated deation shifts wealth in the opposite direction. Understanding which countries and
which parts of society are a¤ected by such ination-induced redistribution is of interest for a
number of reasons: it contributes to understanding the welfare implications associated with
price level surprises and thereby the welfare gains associated with price stability; furthermore,
in a situation with elevated ination or deation risk, it allows to identify those parts of society
that are most exposed to such risk; nally, within a monetary union such as the Euro Area,
the size and the direction of the redistribution are likely to be helpful for understanding coun-
tries incentives to shape union-wide monetary policy outcomes and for understanding their
participation incentives.
We thank Heinz Herrmann, Michael Scharnagl and Ulf von Kalckreuth for helpful comments and suggestions.
Any potential errrors are our own. The views expressed in this paper reect the opinions of the authors and not
nessarily those of the Deutsche Bundesbank or the European System of Central Banks.
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This paper systematically quanties the distributional e¤ects associated with unexpected
price level movements in the Euro Area (EA).1 It documents that even a moderately sized
unexpected movement in the aggregate price level induces quantitatively important wealth
redistribution in the EA. We show this by integrating the newly available Household Finance
and Consumption Survey (HFCS), which is collected by the European System of Central Banks,
with Euro Area Accounts (EAA) data, which provide detailed sectoral balance sheets for all EA
countries. Creating an integrated system of nominal accounts allows us to document which EA
countries are winners and losers of unexpected ination (or deation), how much each of the
countries is winning and losing, how di¤erent economic sectors within each country are a¤ected
by such price level movements, and how gains and losses are distributed at the individual
household level.
We begin our analysis by computing the net nominal position (NNP) of each country, each
sector and each household.2 The NNP is a measure of the nominal claims minus nominal
liabilities held by an economic agent or economic sector and measures how exposed it is to price
level changes. It comprises the direct nominal positions, which consist of nominal claims and
liabilities held outright, but also the indirect nominal positions, which arise from the ownership
of rms (directly or indirectly via investment funds). Since rms are leveraged entities, the
indirect nominal position can be an important component of overall ination exposure. We
fully account for this by attributing the net nominal position of the corporate sector to its
ultimate owners (domestic households, domestic governments, foreigners).
The EA as a whole turns out to be a winner of unexpected ination, as it holds a substantially
negative net nominal position (NNP) vis-a-vis the rest of the world. A 10% surprise increase in
the price level, for example, leads to a per capita gain of approximately 1080 e, which equals
4.2% of EA per capita GDP. A corresponding price level decrease would lead to an overall loss
of the same amount and smaller price level adjustment lead to proportionally smaller e¤ects.
Overall, the redistribution risks associated with price level uncertainty are sizable and suggest
that - to the extent that households are risk averse - there exist strong incentives for avoiding
unexpected inationary or deationary episodes in the EA.
The aggregate gains associated with price level increases turn out to be fairly unevenly
distributed within the EA. The so-calls GIPS countries (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain)
turn out to be the biggest winners of unexpected price level increases,3 with all of them winning
between 1330 e (Portugal) and 2410 e per capita (Greece) from a 10% surprise increase in the
price level. For Greece this amounts to about 14% of per capita GDP, while the gains equal
about 9% of per capita GDP for Spain and Portugal and 6% for Italy. Malta and Belgium lie
1Section 2.6 describes in detail what we mean by unexpected price level movements. Throughout the paper we
focus on unanticipated price level changes, due to lack of information about the maturity structure of bondholdings
at the sectoral level (except for the government sector) and at the individual household level. This together with
lack of information on whether nominal assets carry a xed or variable coupon rate prevents a rigorous assessment
of the distributional consequences of anticipated ination.
2The country level analysis fully includes the government sector, i.e., next to government claims and liabilities
also those held by EA central banks, e.g., via the TARGET2 payment system.
3Correspondingly, these countries are the biggest losers of unexpected price level decreases.
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on the other end of the spectrum and are net losers of unexpected ination, with each of them
losing about 4% and 9% of per capita GDP, respectively. The per capita GDP gains in the EA
thus range from -9% in Belgium to +14% in Greece.
Considerable di¤erences exist across EA countries also at the household (HH) level. We
document this fact by dening the HHs ination exposure as its NNP per unit of net wealth
owned. This measure captures how exposed a HH is to unexpected ination (or deation) per
unit of net wealth and allows for a comparison across HHs with di¤erent wealth levels and across
countries with di¤erent wealth distributions. A value equal to one, for example, indicates that
the HH has invested all its net wealth in nominal assets; a value of zero indicates that the HH
faces in net terms no exposure to price level risk, while a negative value indicates that the HH
is on net a debtor of nominal claims, thus a winner of unexpected ination.4
We then document that the cross-sectional distribution of HH ination exposures varies
considerably across EA countries. For example, the GIPS countries and the former transition
countries (Slovakia and Slovenia) have comparatively many HHs with a close to zero ination
exposure, i.e., HHs owning on net only real assets. In addition, these countries have compar-
atively few HHs who hold virtually all their net wealth in the form of nominal claims. The
opposite is true for some of the EA corecountries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany and
the Netherlands), which - across all EA countries - have the highest share of HHs holding basi-
cally all net wealth in the form of nominal assets; these countries also have the lowest share of
HHs with a close to zero ination exposure.
Considering HHsination exposure across age cohorts and broad social classes (rich, middle
class and poor HHs), we document that the EA as a whole looks very similar to the U.S. and
Canada, as previously analyzed by Doepke and Schneider (2006) and Meh and Terajima (2008),
respectively. In particular, young cohorts turn out to be net debtors of nominal claims while
older cohorts are net holders of nominal claims. Quantitatively, the EA exposure numbers are
very close to the U.S. numbers, when aggregating across all social classes of an age cohort.5 As
a result, unexpected ination leads to a wealth transfer from older HHs to younger HHs. While
in the U.S. the beneciaries of unexpected ination are young middle class and young poor
HHs, the benets in the EA are concentrated entirely among young middle class HHs. Young
poor HHs in the EA hold in net terms virtually no ination exposure.
We also explore the e¤ects of unexpected ination for wealth inequality in the EA. We
nd that surprise ination leads to a decline in the Gini coe¢ cient for the EA net wealth
distribution, as would be the case with a progressive net wealth tax. This occurs because young
borrowing HHs, who are winners of ination, are poorer than older HHs, who are losers of
ination. Yet, important di¤erences exist with regard to this nding across EA countries: in
Austria, Germany and Malta the young middle class HHs borrow on average relatively little,
so that wealth inequality actually increases following surprise ination, similar to what would
4These examples assume that net wealth is positive, which is the case for the large majority of HHs. We
discuss the case with negative net wealth in the main text of the paper.
5The main di¤erence is that in the U.S. ination exposure of the oldest two age cohorts (65-63, >74 years)
ist about 50% higher than in the EA.
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be the case with a regressive wealth tax.
Overall, we nd that in the EA the ination tax is relatively ine¤ective in generating
government revenue in the sense that it requires relative high tax rates to achieve a given level
of revenue. We document this by comparing the revenue generated by a 10% surprise increase
in the price level to that of a more conventional proportional tax on net wealth. For most EA
countries the same government revenue can be generated by a proportional wealth tax in the
range of 1-2%. For some countries (Finland and Cyprus) the wealth tax can be as low as 0.5%,
although for Greece it would have to amount to approximately 4%. This result is obtained even
though the wealth tax, unlike the ination tax, fails to tax foreigners.
We also document that the cross-sectional distribution of the ination exposures across
HHs correlates at the country level strongly with the countrys ination experience since the
inception of the EA: countries that experienced higher ination rates tend to be ones where
HHs are borrowing more (relative to net worth) and where fewer HHs hold their net worth
predominantly in nominal assets. Indeed, grouping countries according to their past ination
experience gives rise to a rst order stochastic dominance ordering with respect to the ination
exposures in the HH sector. We also nd that past ination correlates with the marginal e¤ects
of net worth on ination exposures in the cross section. This suggests that the ination risk
exposure of HHs is inuenced by past ination experience.
In previous work, Doepke and Schneider (2006) study the distributional implications of the
U.S. Great Ination episode in the 1970s. Meh and Terajima (2008) report results for Canada.
Meh, Ríos-Rull and Terajima (2010), analyze the welfare implications of ination targeting
and price-level targeting strategies, calibrating their model to the nominal wealth positions
documented for Canadian data. Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2013) discuss the redistributive
e¤ects of monetary policy in a setting with nancial frictions and how policy can occasionally
use these e¤ects of avoid liquidity and deationary spirals. Coibion, Gorodnichenko, Kueng and
Silvia (2012) analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy shocks for inequality. While not providing
direct evidence for wealth inequality, they show that a contractionary monetary policy shock in
the U.S. raises the inequality of income, labor earnings, expenditures and consumption across
households. Albanesi (2007) documents the positive cross-country relationship between ination
rates and inequality and rationalizes it using a political economy model in which low income
households are more exposed to ination than high income households.
In early work, Bach and Stephenson (1974) and Cukierman, Lennan, and Papadia (1985)
study ination induced redistribution of nominal wealth. These studies do not integrate sectoral
accounts with household data, as the latter were unavailable at the time, and also do not
include indirect nominal positions (INP) arising from rm ownership. Erosa and Ventura (2002)
present a monetary growth model that is consistent with the evidence on heterogeneity in
transaction patterns and portfolio holdings, focusing on the e¤ects of anticipated ination for
transaction balances and their redistributive e¤ects. The present paper studies the distributional
implications of unanticipated ination and takes into account liquid and illiquid nominal claims.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the data
sets, the procedures for integrating them into a coherent accounting framework, and the ac-
counting methodology for computing net nominal exposures. Section 3 presents our baseline
ndings regarding the redistributive e¤ects across EA countries and across di¤erent economic
sectors in each EA country. It also discusses the robustness of these ndings to alternative as-
sumptions and integration approaches. Section 4 presents information about the cross-sectional
distribution of ination exposures at the HH level, documenting important di¤erences across
EA countries. It also o¤ers a comparison with U.S. and Canadian data. Section 5 analyzes
how wealth inequality is a¤ected by unexpected ination. Section 6 documents the relationship
between past ination experience and the cross-sectional distribution of ination exposures at
the HH level. A conclusion briey summarizes and provides an outlook on future work. The
appendices o¤er additional and more detailed information about individual EA countries and
about the accounting methodologies.
2 Data Description and Accounting Methods
2.1 HFCS - Household Finance and Consumption Survey
The Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) is a coordinated HH survey covering
all EA countries, except for Ireland. The core questionnaire is common among the countries
and provides detailed household-level balance sheet information. Financial variables are all re-
ported at market value. The survey covers about 62,000 households and the reference year for
the latest available survey wave is 2010. Data is collected using a harmonized methodology to
insure country-level representativeness. To maximize comparability across countries, the survey
output is harmonized through usage of a common set of target variables. The survey also em-
ployes a common blueprint questionnaire to foster input harmonization. The survey is multiply
imputed to account for missing data and oversamples wealthier households. Household weights
are adjusted for unit non-response and calibrated to external information such as population
distributions. Basic stylized facts of the survey are documented in HFCN (2013b, 2013a).
2.2 EAA - Euro Area Accounts
The Euro Area Accounts (EAA) provide detailed balance sheet information for a number of
economic sectors (households, non-nancial corporations, nancial corporations, government
and rest of the world) for each Euro Area country and for the EA as a whole. The sectoral
balance sheets allow us to identify the nominal assets and liabilities held by each sector in each
of the considered countries.
The EAA establish a quarterly integrated accounting system, which encompasses non-
nancial accounts and nancial accounts. The accounts are integrated to balance the changes
in transaction accounts and balance sheets. The EAA is compiled according to the European
System of Accounts, ESA95(1995), which is the European application of the System of National
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Accounts 1993, SNA93(1993). The EAA combines national data with EA aggregate statistics,
where the latter are produced in collaboration with the national central banks, Eurostat and
the national statistical institutes. The sectoral balance sheet of the HH sector is generally only
indirectly estimated because little direct evidence concerning households is available. For this
reason, we replace in our baseline approach the EAA HH sector balance sheet with information
obtained from the HFCS, as described in the next section.
2.3 HFCS Integration
This section explains how we integrate the HFCS data with the EAA, so as to obtain a coherent
accounting framework for discussing the distributional e¤ects of unexpected ination across
countries, economic sectors and households.
We rst construct from HFCS data the variables showing up in the EAA HH sector balance
sheet, following the suggestions in Honkkila and Kavonius (2012), and then aggregate these
across HHs to compute HFCS aggregates corresponding to the EAA positions. Appendix A
explains in detail how this is achieved. The HFCS aggregates thus obtained tend to di¤er from
their EAA counterparts, with the former typically falling short of the latter. This occurs for
a number of reasons, discussed in Kavonius and Törmälehto (2010), Honkkila and Kavonius
(2012) and HFCN (2013b), one of which is that the HH sector in the EAA comprises non-prot
institutions, e.g., private foundations, while these institutions are not part of the HFCS data
set; another one is that business wealth of the HH sector is (under certain conditions) classied
as a nancial asset in the EAA, while we classify it as a real asset when using the HFCS survey,
see appendix A for further details.
In a second step, we integrate the HFCS data into the EAA, adopting as our baseline the
integration strategy pursued also in Doepke and Schneider (2006), which adjusts the counterpart
positions in the other sectors of the EAA data set pro-rata in line with the HFCS aggregates.6
As a robustness check, we also perform the opposite approach, which amounts to rescaling the
HFCS aggregates, so as to obtain the corresponding position in the HH sector balance sheet
of the EAA. When considering sectoral aggregates only, the latter approach is identical to just
using EAA data. We show in section 3 that these two approaches lead to very similar conclusions
for the sectoral NNPs and thus for the sectoral redistribution e¤ects associated with unexpected
movements in the price level.
2.4 Computation of Net Nominal Positions (NNPs)
This section explains how we compute the net nominal positions (NNP) of the HH sector,
the rm sector (F), the government sector (GOV), the rest of the world sector (ROW) and of
individual HHs. The NNP is a measure of the net ination exposure of a sector or an economic
actor arising from the ownership of nominal claims and liabilities. The NNP is expressed in
Euros, with a positive (negative) NNP indicating that nominal assets exceed (fall short of)
6This is required to retain a zero net supply of nominal claims.
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nominal liabilities. Economic actors with a positive NNP are losers (winners) from unexpected
price level increases (decreases). The computation of the NNPs is based on the integrated
HFCS-EAA data set, as described in the previous section.
As a rst step, we compute the direct net nominal position (DNP), which comprises all nom-
inal assets and liabilities, except those arising indirectly from the ownership of equity/rms. In
a second step, we add to this the indirect net nominal positions (INP) resulting from equity/rm
ownership. The NNPs of a sector or of an individual HH are then dened as the sum of the
DNPs and INPs of the sector or HH.
We explain below how we compute the DNP of a sector or HH. The computation of the
INPs is explained in section 2.5.
The DNP of each sector includes all nancial assets net of nancial liabilities, except for the
equity parts on the asset and liability side. We also exclude monetary gold and special drawing
rights (SDRs) from the nominal positions. We do so because these (government) positions have
no counterpart in the private sector accounts of the EAA, so that by excluding them the NNP
of all sectors sum up to zero (except for rounding discrepancies).7 Exclusion of these items has
a quantitatively small e¤ect on our results. Appendix A provides the list of variables used for
computing the DNPs.
An important aspect for computing the HH sector NNPs regards the treatment of pension
claims. In our analysis, we distinguish between pay-as-you-go social security schemes and other
individual account based pension and life insurance claims. In particular, we exclude pay-as-
you-go social security claims and payment obligations from our analysis, which amounts to
assuming that the claims and benets generated by these systems are fully indexed to the
price level. This is partly motivated by the fact that neither the HFCS nor the EAA contain
information on pay-as-you-go social security claims and benets, but also by the fact that social
security contributions tend to be a xed share of nominal wage income, i.e., are e¤ectively
indexed.8
Regarding dened contribution and individual dened pension benet and life insurance
schemes, we treat these claims in the HH sector, as well as their counterparts in the nancial
sector of the EAA, as nominal claims. This is motivated by the fact that insurance companies in
the Euro area are predominantly invested in nominal claims.9 Moreover, pension owners often
do not have a direct claim on the (relatively small) equity positions of the insurance sector, as
they often own such positions only indirectly via life insurance type contracts. This represents
7Furthermore, monetary gold is de-facto a real asset, while SDRs represent more an outstanding credit line
than a nancial claim.
8Some EA countries apply upper caps to social security contributions, which would cause contributions not
to be fully indexed to the price level absent changes to social security law.
9Of the e 6.7 trn of nancial assets held by insurance corporations and pension funds in the EA, only about
e 0.85 trn are invested in equity. A further e 1.6 trn is invested in mutual funds, but these are to a large extent
themselves invested in nominal claims: the other nancial intermediaries sector, which consists mainly of mutual,
private equity and hedge funds, holds only about 36% of its assets in quoted and unquoted shares. This suggests
that of the e 6.6. trn of pension assets in the insurance sector only about e 1.4trn (=0.85 trn+36%1.7trn), i.e.,
only about 21% are invested in equities. Given that the other nancial intermediaries sector contains also private
equity and hedge funds, which tend to have a higher equity share, the true equity share is likely to be even lower.
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an important institutional di¤erence relative to the U.S. where individual investment accounts
are much more widespread in retirement plans.
2.5 Accounting for Firm Ownership
To compute nominal exposures, we need to account for rm ownership by households (HH),
the government (GOV) and the rest of the world (ROW). This is important because rms tend
to be leveraged claims, i.e., entities that on net issue nominal debt, so that rm ownership
represents a hedge against ination risk.
Let EHH and EGOV denote the equity claims of domestic households and the domestic
government, respectively.10 We shall assume that domestic governments own domestic rms
only11 and decompose household equity claims into
EHH = EHH_D + EHH_F ; (1)
where EHH_D and EHH_F denote domestic and foreign equity, respectively. Furthermore, let
EF_A and EF_L denote the equity positions on the asset and liability side of the domestic rm
sector, respectively.12 We decompose the asset side as follows
EF_A = EF_A_D + EF_A_F ; (2)
where EF_A_D denotes ownership of domestic rms and EF_A_F ownership of foreign rms.
Finally, let EROW_A and EROW_L denote the equity positions on the asset and liability side
of the ROW, respectively.
Using these denitions we have
EF_L   EROW_A   EGOV = EF_A_D + EHH_D; (3)
where the l.h.s. is the total equity issued by domestic rms (EF_L), net of the equity owned
by the ROW (EROW_A) and the equity held by the GOV (EGOV ). The remaining equity must
be held either by domestic rms (EF_A_D) or domestic households (EHH_D). We also have
EROW_L = EHH_F + EF_A_F ; (4)
which states that the equity liabilities of the ROW (EROW_L) must either be held by domestic
10Some countries (ES, FI, IE, SI, SK) report a (quantitatively small) equity position on the liability side of the
GOV balance sheet. If so, we let EGOV denote the net equity claim of the government sector. The household
sector never has an equity position on its liability side. The equity position of a HH sector in the HFCS data,
is computed by adding the HFCS counterparts of the following EEA positions: quoted shares, unquoted shares
and equity mutual fund shares.
11None of the considered countries runs a sovereign wealth fund.
12 In the nancial accounts, the equity positions of the rm sector are not reported in consolidated form: if a
domestic rm owns the equity of another domestic rm, then this position appears on the asset and liability side
of the rm sector balance sheet.
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households (EHH_F ) or domestic rms (EF_A_F ).13
Equations (1)-(4) represent four equations in the four unknown variables (EHH_D, EHH_F ,
EF_A_D, EF_A_F ). The equations are nevertheless insu¢ cient to determine the unknowns be-
cause the system su¤ers from a rank-deciency resulting from an accounting identity: summing
equations (3) and (4) and using (1) and (2) to substitute the terms on the r.h.s. of the summed
equation, one obtains the identity that the net equity claims of the domestic sectors (HH, GOV
and rms) must equal the negative of the net equity claim of the ROW. To identify all variables,
one thus needs one additional identifying assumption. We shall consider the following scenarios
which span the range of plausible assumptions:
Maximum HH Home Bias: All foreign equity is held by the domestic rm sector (EF_A_F =
EROW_L), which amounts to assuming a perfect equity home bias in householdsequity
portfolio (EHH_F = 0).14
Identical Home Bias: Households and rms are equally internationally diversied in their
equity positions, i.e., EF_A_F =EF_A_D = EHH_A_F =EHH_A_D.
Maximum Firm Home Bias All foreign equity is held by domestic households (EF_A_F =
EROW_L), which amounts to assuming perfect equity home bias by rms (EF_A_F = 0).15
As our baseline we shall use the Identical Home Biasassumption. Section 3 shows, however,
that results regarding the net nominal positions of the HH, GOV and ROW sectors are very
similar when entertaining one of the other identifying assumptions instead.
We are now in a position to compute the net nominal exposure of domestic rms per unit of
equity issued.16 Let DNPF denote the direct net nominal position of the domestic rm sector,
i.e., nominal assets minus nominal liabilities of the rm sector balance sheet. DNPF tends to
be negative, as rms issue typically more nominal debt relative to the nominal claims they hold.
DNPF does not include the nominal exposures generated in the domestic rm sector due to
the ownership of foreign rms, which are themselves leveraged claims. We therefore add the
latter positions.
Let R denote the net nominal claims per unit of equity issued by the domestic rm sector
R =
DNPF
EF_L   EF_A_D ;
where EF_L  EF_A_D denotes domestic rm equity issued that is not held by domestic rms
themselves. In what follows we will assume that the same nominal exposure ratio R applies
to foreign equity held by domestic rms. This appears justied if domestic rmschoice of R
13Recall that we assume that the domestic GOV does not to own foreign equities.
14For countries in which EROW_L > EF_A we attribute the remaining foreign equity holdings to the houshold
sector, i.e., then set EHH_A_F = EROW_L   EF_A, EF_A_D = 0 and EF_A_F = EF_A.
15For countries in which EROW_L > EHH_A we attribute the remaining foreign equity holdings to the rm
sector, i.e., then set EF_A_F = EROW_L   EHH_A, EHH_A_D = 0 and EHH_A_F = EHH_A.
16Using EF_A_F =EF_A_D = EHH_A_F =EHH_A_D together with equations (1), (2) and (4) it is straightfor-
ward to determine (EHH_D, EHH_F , EF_A_D, EF_A_F ).
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reects the preferences of domestic investors and if domestic rms and households invest abroad
on average in rms with the same nominal exposure characteristics.
With this assumption we can compute the net nominal exposure of domestic rms arising
from ownership of foreign rms, which equals R  EF_A_F , so that total net nominal position
of the domestic rm sector TNPF is given by
TNPF = DNPF +R  EF_A_F
We then distribute TNPF to the HH, GOV and the ROW sectors according to their ownership
shares EHH_D; EGOV and EROW_A. Furthermore, we attribute the nominal exposure EHH_F 
R to the HH sector, due to outright ownership of foreign rms by HHs. Within the household
sector we distribute the exposures according to the relative ownership shares of equity reported
in the HFCS survey.
To preserve symmetry of the nominal balance sheet positions between domestic agents and
the ROW, we furthermore need to add the following nominal exposure to the ROW balance
sheet, which arises from attributing the exposure from foreign ownership of rms to HH, GOV,
and ROW, as described above:
 R   EF_A_F + EHH_F  :
Proceeding this way we have incorporated nominal exposures of the rm sector and of foreign
equity holdings into the balance sheets of the households, government and the ROW.
2.6 Unexpected Ination: The Thought Experiment
In the remainder of this paper we will consider the e¤ects of a one-time unexpected increase
in the price level by 10%. By this we mean that all nominal prices increase by this amount,
i.e., current prices but also all state-contingent future prices. As a result, all relative prices,
including future ination as well as current and future nominal interest rates remain unchanged.
Provided the wealth redistributions generated by the price level surprise do not give rise to
relative demand shifts, as would be the case, for example, when HHs have identical homothetic
preferences, see Chipman (1974), the new state contingent price path remains consistent with
equilibrium. Moreover, the present value of rm prots remains unchanged, so that the e¤ects
of unexpected price level changes on equity valuations can be captured by the changes in real
value of rmstotal net nominal position (TNPF ), as determined in the previous section. This
holds true whenever equity valuations are frictionless, i.e., reect the present value of future
prots plus the value of rmsnet nancial claims.
While a 10% price level jump may appear large, especially given the historical experience
in the EA, unexpected price level surprises repeatedly occur with smaller magnitudes.17 The
17 In practice, movements in the general price level are always accompanied by additional movements in relative
prices. We consider purely the redistributive e¤ects of changes in the general price level.
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redistributive e¤ects of smaller or larger price level changes can be assessed by proportionally
scaling the numbers reported in the present paper for a 10% increase in the price level increase.
In particular, when considering a price level decrease instead of an increase, all redistributive
e¤ects reverse their sign.
3 Winning and Losing Countries and Sectors
3.1 Baseline Findings
Using the baseline methodology described in the previous sections, table 1 reports the net
nominal positions (NNPs) for the Euro Area (EA) as a whole and for all EA countries.18 The
table reports the nominal positions for the three sectors that are the ultimate holders of nancial
claims (GOV, HH, ROW), where the net position of the ROW is the mirror image of the joint
positions reported for the GOV and the HH sectors. The nominal positions are reported once
in per capita terms and once scaled by GDP of the considered country or currency area.
A positive NNP in the ROW column in table 1 indicates that the ROW is losing from unex-
pected price level increases. For the EA, for example, an unexpected price level increase by 10%
leads to a real gain of 1080 e per capita (p.c.) at the expense of the ROW.19 This corresponds
to gain of 4.2% of GDP, i.e., a sizable wealth redistribution. Table 1 reveals, however, that the
EA gains are distributed unequally within the EA: while domestic governments gain 1860 e
p.c., the domestic HH sector is losing 780 e p.c.
Table 1 shows that the governments of all EA countries are winners of unexpected price level
increases, except for the government of Luxembourg. The sectoral evidence for Luxemburg must,
however, be interpreted with care: due to the large size of the nancial sector in Luxembourg,
even small margins of errors in the computation of the business sectors total net nominal
position (TNPF ) can have considerable e¤ects on the reported outcomes, whenever these are
scaled by domestic variables such as domestic population or GDP.20 In the rest of this section,
we therefore ignore the data reported for Luxembourg.21 Considerable uncertainties also exist
regarding the Dutch gures: as we show in the next section, the Dutch sectoral results turn
out not to be robust to alternative ways of integrating the HFCS data with the EAA data.22
18Since HFCS data is not available for Ireland, table 1 reports the EAA data for Ireland, i.e., skipping the
EAA-HFCS integration step described in section 2.3. The EA aggregates reported in table 1 are obtained by
summing the individual country data after integrating the HFCS into the EAA at the country level (again, for
Ireland we use pure EAA data). Very similar results are obtained when instead integrating the HFCS data at
the EA level.
19This is 10% of the reported ROW EA NNP of 10.8 thousand Euros.
20For Luxembourg, the NNP of the ROW before accounting for rm ownerwhip is -1.1 trn e. After incor-
porating rm ownership, this number shrinks to -17 bln e, which is large relative to population size, but small
relative to the initial position and in absolute terms.
21These problems do not a¤ect the distributional information obtained from HFCS data for Luxembourg, as
reported later on.
22This is due to the fact that in the Netherlands there exists a large and asymmetric discrepancy between
HFCS aggregates and EAA aggregates: for nancial assets the HFCS/EAA coverage ratio is only 0.33, while the
ratio equals 0.92 for nancial liabilities. This asymmetry could be due to a variety of reasons: interest payments
on mortgage debt are tax deductable in the Netherlands, thus have been declared to authorities before; tax
deductability may cause debt to be very stable over time and thus mentally easier to recall; the Netherlands
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The same applies for the results reported for Cyprus in table 1.23 We shall thus also ignore the
outcome for the Dutch and Cypriot data in rest of this section.
NNP per capita NNP/GDP
GOV HH ROW GOV HH ROW
(thousands of Euros)
Euro Area -18.6 7.8 10.8 -0.73 0.30 0.42
Austria -21.7 11.6 10.1 -0.70 0.37 0.32
Belgium -27.6 40.8 -13.2 -0.93 1.37 -0.44
Cyprus* -9.9 -7.2 17.0 -0.52 -0.38 0.89
Finland -3.0 -8.4 11.3 -0.10 -0.27 0.37
France -22.3 10.6 11.7 -0.81 0.39 0.43
Germany -17.4 15.3 2.2 -0.60 0.53 0.08
Greece -22.9 -1.2 24.1 -1.34 -0.07 1.41
Ireland -19.2 21.8 -2.6 -0.54 0.61 -0.07
Italy -23.2 8.1 15.1 -0.99 0.35 0.64
Luxembourg* 22.7 12.0 -34.7 0.35 0.18 -0.53
Malta -8.3 20.1 -11.8 -0.63 1.52 -0.89
Netherlands* -16.5 -9.5 25.9 -0.50 -0.29 0.78
Portugal -13.1 -0.2 13.3 -0.88 -0.01 0.89
Slovakia -4.8 2.2 2.6 -0.54 0.24 0.29
Slovenia -8.6 2.9 5.7 -0.56 0.19 0.37
Spain -12.4 -6.7 19.1 -0.60 -0.32 0.93
* country result not robust to HFCS-EAA integration approach
Table 1: Net nominal position (NNP), baseline results
Table 1 reveals that most EA countries gain from the ROW following unexpected price level
increases. The ve largest winners are the so-called GIPS countries, with Greece winning 2410e
p.c. from a 10% price level increase, Spain winning 1910 e, Cyprus 1700 e, Italy 1510 e and
Portugal 1330 e (all in p.c. terms). Two countries turn out to be net losers of ination, with
Belgium losing 1320 e p.c. and Malta losing 1180 e p.c.. In both countries this is due to the
large amount of nominal claims accumulated in the HH sector. Some of the countries, e.g.,
Germany, Ireland, and Slovakia, remain in the aggregate largely una¤ected by unexpected price
level changes (although considerable wealth redistribution occurs within these countries); the
remaining countries are moderate to medium-sized winners, with gains ranging from 560 e p.c.
is the only country that carried out the HFCS using computer assisted web interviews, i.e., without relying on
personal contact with an interviewer, which may a¤ect the informational content of Dutch HFCS data.
23As with Dutch data, see footnote 22, the Cypriot data displays a considerable asymmetry between HFCS
and EAA aggregates: the former cover only 37% of EAA assets, but 87% of EAA liabilities.
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(Slovenia) to 1170 e p.c. (France).
For the HH sector there exists considerable heterogeneity across EA countries. In some
countries, the HH sector is even a net winner of ination. For the considered 10% unexpected
price level increase, HHs gain 840 e p.c. in Finland, 670 e in Spain, 120 e in Greece and 20 e
in Portugal (all in p.c. terms). The HH sector is a net loser in all other countries, with the three
largest losers being HHs in Belgium (-4080 e p.c.), Ireland (-2180 e p.c.) and Malta (-2010 e
p.c.). In the remaining countries, the HH sector loses approximately in line with the per capita
losses experienced for the EA as whole (-780 e p.c.).
Maximum HH Maximum Firm
Home Bias Home Bias
GOV HH ROW GOV HH ROW
(thousands of Euros) (thousands of Euros)
Euro Area -18.6 7.5 11.1 -18.7 8.4 10.3
Austria -21.8 12.2 9.5 -21.7 10.5 11.1
Belgium -27.6 38.2 -10.6 -27.8 45.5 -17.7
Cyprus* -9.9 -7.6 17.4 -9.9 -6.8 16.6
Finland -3.0 -8.2 11.2 -2.9 -8.5 11.4
France -22.3 10.3 11.9 -22.4 12.1 10.3
Germany -17.4 14.4 3.0 -17.6 17.5 0.1
Greece -22.9 -1.0 24.0 -22.9 -1.3 24.2
Ireland -19.2 19.1 0.1 -19.2 22.5 -3.3
Italy -23.2 7.9 15.3 -23.2 8.8 14.5
Luxembourg* 22.8 7.5 -30.2 22.7 13.0 -35.6
Malta -8.3 19.5 -11.2 -8.4 21.0 -12.7
Netherlands* -16.5 -10.0 26.5 -16.5 -9.3 25.7
Portugal -13.1 -0.1 13.2 -13.0 -0.9 13.9
Slovakia -4.8 2.2 2.6 -4.8 2.2 2.6
Slovenia -8.7 3.0 5.6 -8.4 2.4 6.0
Spain -12.5 -5.6 18.1 -12.2 -10.1 22.3
* country result not robust to HFCS-EAA integration approach
Table 2: NNP per capita, alternative ownership assumptions
3.2 Robustness Analysis
This section documents that most of the ndings reported in the previous section turn out to
be robust to entertaining a range of alternative assumptions.
Table 2 below evaluates the e¤ects of alternative ownership assumptions regarding foreign
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equity. Our baseline approach assumes that rms and households hold equal portfolio shares
of foreign equities, see section 2.5. The columns titled Maximum HH Home Bias in table 2
assume instead that foreign equity is held by domestic rms, while the columns titled Maximum
Firm Home Biasexplore the implications of assuming that foreign equity is held by the HH
sector. Table 2 reveals that the ndings previously reported in table 1 turn out to be very
stable with respect to making alternative foreign ownership assumptions. The Spearman rank
correlation coe¢ cient for the three sectors and the 16 countries between the baseline results in
table 1 and those reported in table 2 is above 0.99, for each of the two considered alternative
ownership assumptions.
GOV HH ROW
(thousands of Euros)
Euro Area -22.2 14.2 8.0
Austria -23.5 14.9 8.6
Belgium -28.7 53.1 -24.4
Cyprus -13.1 7.1 5.8
Finland -7.3 -3.4 10.7
France -27.0 18.0 9.0
Germany -20.2 19.3 0.9
Greece -27.7 4.2 23.5
Ireland -19.2 21.8 -2.6
Italy -30.0 11.7 18.3
Luxembourg 22.5 62.2 -84.7
Malta -8.8 22.4 -13.6
Netherlands -21.7 34.8 -13.1
Portugal -15.1 4.5 10.6
Slovakia -5.3 3.7 1.6
Slovenia -8.8 2.4 6.4
Spain -13.1 -6.2 19.3
Table 3: NNP per capita, alternative HFCS-EAA integration approach
Next, we explore the e¤ects of an alternative approach for integrating HFCS data into the
EAA. The baseline approach, described in section 2.3, consists of reconciling di¤erences in HFCS
and EAA aggregates by adjusting the EAA counterparts of HFCS positions, in line with the
approach in Doepke and Schneider (2006). We now explore the e¤ects of pursuing the opposite
strategy, i.e., rescaling HFCS positions to match the EAA aggregates.24 Table 3 below reports
the outcomes of this approach. Along the dimensions emphasized in the previous section, results
24For the sectoral outcomes reported in table 3, this delivers the same results as when using EAA data only.
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are fairly similar to those reported in table 1. In particular, Greece, Spain, and Italy continue
to be the countries winning most from unexpected ination, but Finland now just overtakes
Portugal in terms of per capita gains. The results for Cyprus, Luxembourg and the Netherlands
change signicantly relative to table 1, justifying our caution in interpreting the ndings for
these countries reported in table 1. Abstracting from these countries, it continues to be true that
Malta and Belgium are the biggest losers of unexpected ination. For the remaining countries,
the most important e¤ect of the alternative integration approach consists of an increase in the
HH sector NNP and - correspondingly - a decrease in the ROW NNP. Despite these di¤erences,
the Spearman rank correlation coe¢ cient for the three sectors and the 16 considered countries
between the baseline results in table 1 and those displayed in table 3 remains high and equal
to 0.86, indicating that results in terms of countriesrelative ranking reported in table 1 are
rather robust to the considered alternative integration approach.
4 Winning and Losing Households
This section analyzes the redistributive e¤ects of unexpected ination at the level of individual
HHs. It documents the distribution of ination exposures in the EA and in individual EA
countries, analyzes the HH characteristics associated with di¤erent ination exposures and
compares ination exposures across di¤erent age cohorts and social classes. Section 4.1 compares
the EA results to those previously documented for the United States and Canada. Section 4.2
presents detailed results across age cohorts and social classes for individual EA countries.
Using the HFCS data and the methods described in section 2.5, we can compute the net
nominal position (NNP) of each HH in the survey. Using the same data allows computing each
HHs net wealth (NW) position. Provided net wealth is positive, the ratio of the net nominal
position over net wealth (NNP/NW) captures the households exposure to unexpected moves in
ination per unit of wealth owned: a NNP to NW ratio of 0.5, for example, indicates that the
HH su¤ers a 5% net wealth loss form an unexpected 10% increase in the price level. Conversely,
a ratio of -0.5 indicates a 5% net wealth gain due to this price level adjustment. Since households
cannot e¤ectively short real assets, we have NNPNW and thus NNP/NW 1, whenever the
HH has positive NW.
Figure 1 depicts the distribution of ination exposures (NNP/NW) for all HHs with a
positive NW position.25 It presents results for the Euro Area as a whole (top left panel), as well
as for individual EA countries.26 The gure abstracts from all EA household with a negative
NW position (approximately 6% of all HHs), which will be discussed further below.27
The exposure distribution for the EA displays a peak around the zero exposure point:
25The distributions are computed using populations weights from the HFCS.
26The EA distribution in gure 1 is obtained by aggregating the individual distributions shown in the gure.
Since HFCS data is not available for Ireland, the EA aggregate does not included Irish HHs, which should have
a quantitatively small e¤ect on the aggregate EA distribution.
27The gure also truncates the distribution below -1, thereby eliminating large negative NNP/NW positions
resulting from NW position close to zero. The exluded share of HHs is negligible.
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Figure 1: Empirical distribution of ination exposures (NNP/NW) in the HH sector
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about 21% of all EA HHs have virtually no ination exposure, when dened as NNP=NW 2
[ 0:05; 0:05[. There is a thin tail to the left of this peak, consisting of about 15% of all EA HHs,
which are net borrowers (NNP=NW <  0:05). To the right of the zero exposure position,
the density rst decays but later on an increases as ination exposure rises: approximately
35% of all EA HHs are holding predominately real assets (NNP=NW 2 [0:05; 0:5[), with a
further 14% holding predominately nominal assets (NNP=NW 2 [0:5; 0:95[). A substantial 9%
of HHs are bunched at the right end of the distribution and hold almost only nominal assets
(NW=NNP 2 [0:95; 1]).
The panels for the individual countries depicted in gure 1 show that the pattern documented
for the EA as a whole exists in similar form in all EA member countries, albeit important
di¤erences exist. The share of HHs holding almost only nominal assets (NNP=NW 2 [0:95; 1])
is particularly pronounced in some of the EA corecountries, reaching 17% in Germany, 15% in
Austria, 13% in the Netherlands, and 11% in Finland. It is lowest in some of the current crisis
countries, i.e., Cyprus (2%), Italy (2%), Greece (4%) and Spain(4%), as well as in the former
transition countries Slovenia (2%) and Slovakia (3%). Furthermore, the latter two countries
display a high peak around the zero exposure point, with many HHs holding virtually no
ination exposure (53% in Slovenia, 43% in Slovakia). The next highest values in this category
are achieved by the crisis countries, with Greece reaching 45%, Spain and Italy both 36% and
Portugal 30%. The lowest HH shares with virtually no ination exposure are found in Germany
and the Netherlands (both 7%), followed with a distance by Belgium (15%) and Austria (16%).
Table 4 below presents a number of summary statistics for EA HHs with di¤erent ination
exposures. For each HH group, table 4 reports the medium age of the HH head, the average
education attained by the HH head, where education levels are discretely coded between zero
(no formal education) and seven (second stage tertiary education) using the denitions of the
International Standard Classication of Education (ISCED 1997)28, the share of HHs owning
real estate, the median income, the medium net wealth level and the number of HHs in the
respective group.29 For benchmark purposes, the rst row in table 4 reports the characteristics
when considering all EA HHs.
Table 4 reveals that HHs with negative net worth tend to be comparatively young, tend to
have relatively low education levels and low income, and rarely own a house. The median net
wealth position, however, is only moderately negative.30 Nevertheless, the group of HHs with
negative NW is sizable and consists of 7.7m HHs in the EA.
As table 4 shows, borrowing HHs, HHs with no ination exposure and HHs holding predom-
inantly holding real assets are all relatively rich and are to a vast majority real estate owners.
Together, these three HH groups account for 71% of all EA HHs. Borrowing HHs thereby
28The coding used is as follows: 0 - no formal education or below 1; 1 - primary education; 2 - lower secondary
or second stage of basic education; 3 - upper secondary; 4 - post-secondary; 5 - rst stage tertiary; 6 - second
stage tertiary education.
29The latter is computed using the population weights from the HFCS.
30Further investigation shows that most of these HHs tend to have a NNP/NW of close to one, indicating that
their negative net wealth is approximately equal to their net nominal position (with both being negative).
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have lower wealth levels than the other two groups, but the highest median income and mean
education level of all HH groups. Borrowing HHs are also considerably younger. Households
holding predominantly or almost exclusively nominal assets are considerably poorer: their me-
dian wealth level remains below 20% of the median net wealth levels reported for the other HH
groups holding positive wealth. Their income is also lower, although some of these HHs are
well-educated. HHs with predominantly nominal assets also rarely own a house.
The patterns documented for the EA in table 4 are similarly present at the country level,
albeit some important di¤erences exists. The share of HHs with negative NW, for example,
varies considerably across EA countries, reaching 12% in Finland and being as low as 1% in
Slovakia. Appendix B reports for each individual EA country the numbers displayed in table 4
for the EA as a whole.
Euro Area Median Mean Share of Median Median # of HH
Age Edu Home Income Net Wealth HHs share
Owners (thou e) (thou e) (mln)
All households 53 2.9 59% 28.1 125.0 130.9 100%
Negative net worth 41 2.9 13% 20.6 -3.4 7.7 6%
Borrower 45 3.3 87% 37.9 173.2 19.1 15%
Almost no exposure 58 2.5 86% 23.0 201.2 28.1 21%
Pred. real assets 58 3.0 74% 32.4 217.6 45.7 35%
Pred. nominal assets 48 3.1 10% 28.7 30.3 18.7 14%
Almost only nom. assets 50 2.9 0% 17.9 7.3 11.6 9%
Table 4: Ination exposure and HH characteristics
4.1 Comparison with US and Canadian Data
We now document HHsnominal exposures across age cohorts and broad social classes, compar-
ing results to those documented for the U.S. by Doepke and Schneider (2006) and for Canada
by Meh and Terajima (2008).
Following this earlier work, we dene - for any considered age cohort - Rich HHsas those
within the top 10% of the cohort NW distribution. The remaining HHs of the cohort are
then sorted by income into two additional groups, labeled Middle Class (70% of the total
population) and Poor HHs(20% of all HHs, at the bottom of the income distribution of all non-
rich HHs). For every cohort, we compute the average NNP and normalize it by average cohort
NW. The resulting measure can be interpreted as the ination exposure of the representative
or average household within the considered cohort.
Table 5a documents results for the EA. It expresses the average NNP over average NW in
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percentage points and shows that young middle class HHs in the EA are on average considerably
indebted, while rich and poor HHs of the youngest two cohorts have a close to zero exposure.
As HHs become older, their ination exposure increases stronger than NW, with the highest age
cohorts reaching the highest exposure. The results for the U.S. and Canada are quantitatively
very similar, when considering the cohort results for all social classes together (listed in the row
labeled Totalin Table 5a). The main quantitative di¤erence to the EA is that older HHs in
the U.S. and Canada hold in relative terms a 50% higher ination exposure.
More noticeable di¤erences emerge when comparing di¤erent social classes. In the U.S. and
Canada young poor HHs have a considerably negative ination exposure, indicating their ability
to borrow against future income, while the young poor cohorts in the EA have a close to zero
exposure on average. As we shall see in the next section, there exists considerable heterogeneity
across young poor cohorts across EA countries.
Age cohort
 34 35  44 45  54 55  64 65  74 > 74
EA Rich HHs -1.5 5.5 10.3 13.9 12.3 20.7
Middle Class -80.4 -15.3 1.0 9.6 13.7 22.8
Poor HHs 1.0 -4.2 9.4 14.5 12.4 15.5
Total -48.3 -11.6 3.1 11.0 13.2 19.3
US Rich HHs -14.0 3.8 6.6 16.3 16.7 27.5
Middle Class -114.0 -31.6 -4.8 14.0 25.2 38.1
Poor HHs -36.6 -33.8 -5.5 7.5 17.5 26.4
Total -42.6 -10.1 2.3 15.2 19.4 30.6
CA Rich HHs -2.7 2.2 16.4 17.5 27.5 29.8
Middle Class -89.4 -26.5 11.4 26.0 29.4 33.9
Poor HHs -52.1 -27.1 -3.3 20.7 14.2 23.8
Total -35.8 -11.2 13.1 22.1 27.9 31.9
Table 5a: Ination exposure (NNP/NW, % points) across age cohorts
4.2 Results for Individual EA Countries
Table 5b provides detailed information about ination exposures across age cohorts and social
classes for individual EA countries. It shows that the EA gures reported in table 5a mask a
considerable amount of cross-country heterogeneity.
While the overall ination exposure of young poor HHs in the EA is approximately zero,
young poor HHs in the Netherlands, Finland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain and Portugal hold
considerably negative exposures. Yet, these HH categories typically hold sizable positive ex-
posures in Germany, Malta, Slovenia and France. Borrowing of young low-income HHs thus
displays considerable variation across EA countries, which overall gives rise to the zero exposure
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documented in the previous section.
There exists also a considerable degree of heterogeneity with respect to the ination exposure
of old rich HHs. Their exposure is highest in Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Slovenia,
sometimes reaching values close to 50%. It is lowest in Spain, Cyprus and Greece where even
old rich HHs often have a close to zero exposure to price level risk.
Table 5b: Ination exposure (NNP/NW, % points) across
age cohorts
Age cohort
<= 34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 > 74
Austria
Rich HHs -1.42 0.61 6.16 6.93 13.71 13.09
Middle Class -17.87 -4.44 13.90 17.54 15.57 21.89
Poor HHs -4.95 -1.78 13.75 14.85 15.08 15.00
Total -12.42 -3.55 13.11 15.82 15.24 18.38
Belgium
Rich HHs 3.59 30.55 42.42 47.61 40.90 49.02
Middle Class -37.75 -1.56 14.49 26.33 26.00 27.99
Poor HHs -55.74 4.86 18.83 18.21 11.73 22.02
Total -39.37 2.67 17.81 26.50 23.06 27.79
Cyprus
Rich HHs -1.20 3.02 2.23 5.08 6.45 3.76
Middle Class -27.56 -18.60 -7.98 -0.49 5.53 14.46
Poor HHs -21.74 -3.30 -21.24 2.74 5.40 7.90
Total -24.43 -13.91 -8.48 0.51 5.56 8.67
Finland
Rich HHs -27.01 -6.78 -1.79 4.50 9.04 4.90
Middle Class -341.34 -57.18 -25.21 0.77 6.52 9.70
Poor HHs -90.07 -36.40 -8.31 3.90 12.77 12.66
Total -243.32 -50.04 -20.49 1.77 8.90 10.79
France
Rich HHs -0.62 4.51 9.05 18.15 21.89 38.01
Middle Class -67.98 -21.00 -0.20 11.70 16.43 23.54
Poor HHs 10.32 -5.71 3.29 6.71 13.14 15.89
Total -37.11 -16.37 1.26 11.27 16.09 21.75
Germany
Rich HHs 5.69 14.67 17.98 15.68 13.53 17.34
Middle Class 8.48 -4.91 8.13 14.48 18.95 31.58
continued on next page
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Age cohort
<= 34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 > 74
Poor HHs 30.83 11.74 30.36 37.49 23.31 31.33
Total 17.00 -0.63 12.04 19.36 19.56 30.09
Greece
Rich HHs -1.11 0.01 2.81 4.38 3.24 5.54
Middle Class -23.94 -10.56 -6.47 -3.52 1.96 8.59
Poor HHs -4.72 -15.60 -4.77 -2.13 4.83 2.45
Total -15.55 -10.08 -5.41 -2.49 3.13 5.02
Italy
Rich HHs 1.98 2.81 7.51 10.80 8.17 13.66
Middle Class -10.77 0.03 3.39 9.31 9.86 14.82
Poor HHs -7.55 1.05 -0.51 5.83 7.13 6.80
Total -8.68 0.48 3.29 8.96 8.82 10.58
Luxembourg
Rich HHs -2.28 7.37 9.35 12.52 8.19 18.07
Middle Class -81.95 -22.68 -0.30 8.75 9.12 15.97
Poor HHs -51.30 -9.91 -3.83 4.32 6.97 7.24
Total -66.68 -16.96 -0.19 8.32 8.40 12.63
Malta
Rich HHs 5.68 10.38 15.67 19.18 15.29 16.30
Middle Class 3.28 4.13 16.29 20.07 13.81 24.06
Poor HHs 16.28 3.37 25.20 14.62 19.22 16.07
Total 5.02 4.62 17.29 18.84 16.24 18.46
Netherlands
Rich HHs -45.67 12.60 14.18 23.82 14.29 48.00
Middle Class -774.80 -77.02 -26.34 0.94 6.49 22.81
Poor HHs -242.55 -35.12 -3.11 3.36 7.86 37.01
Total -598.89 -60.13 -17.77 3.72 7.74 29.96
Portugal
Rich HHs -15.18 -4.44 2.27 5.60 4.71 13.67
Middle Class -50.43 -31.10 -6.47 4.82 13.61 15.29
Poor HHs -37.00 -21.70 -1.32 5.47 11.64 14.29
Total -44.49 -27.22 -4.76 5.05 12.07 14.62
Slovakia
Rich HHs 7.86 4.66 7.96 10.96 14.24 7.52
Middle Class -7.15 5.55 9.92 10.86 6.17 4.43
continued on next page
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Age cohort
<= 34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 > 74
Poor HHs -4.85 3.70 6.54 8.37 5.82 5.35
Total -5.22 5.20 9.31 10.27 6.76 5.18
Slovenia
Rich HHs -0.27 3.42 6.41 22.21 1.56 30.26
Middle Class 2.05 3.95 1.57 5.48 3.20 5.83
Poor HHs 10.17 -7.70 -3.57 0.60 1.09 2.83
Total 2.84 2.02 0.73 5.91 2.29 6.73
Spain
Rich HHs -4.08 -10.27 -5.23 -1.04 -0.64 2.15
Middle Class -62.69 -23.34 -6.44 0.82 3.23 9.34
Poor HHs -25.82 -19.07 -0.05 2.94 4.88 6.33
Total -51.60 -21.50 -5.46 1.03 3.54 6.71
5 Ination Tax, Wealth Tax and Inequality
This section explores the e¤ects of an unexpected price level increase for wealth inequality, using
the Gini coe¢ cient for the HH net wealth distribution as inequality measure. It considers the
EA as a whole, as well as individual EA countries and also compares the e¤ects of the ination
tax to that of a revenue-equivalent proportional wealth tax.
Table 6 below reports the Gini coe¢ cient of the observed net wealth (NW) distribution (sec-
ond column), the Gini coe¢ cient after an unexpected 10% price level increase (third column),
as well as the associated percentage change in the Gini coe¢ cient (fourth column).
Table 6 reveals that net wealth inequality is highest in Austria and Germany and lowest
in Slovakia and Slovenia. The results for the EA furthermore show that surprise ination
decreases net wealth inequality for the EA as a whole. The same is true for all individual EA
countries, except for Austria, Germany and Malta, where unexpected ination increases wealth
inequality. In the latter countries, the young middle class cohorts are on net no or only very
moderate borrowers, see table 5a. As a result, the young cohorts, which tend to be poorer in
terms of accumulated net wealth (although not necessarily in terms of their expected present
value of income), gain considerably less from surprise increases in the price level. Inequality
therefore slightly increases following surprise ination. Indeed, the Spearman rank correlation
across countries between the changes in the Gini coe¢ cient reported in table 6 and the average
of the ination exposures (NNP/NW) of the youngest two middle class age cohorts reported in
table 5a is equal to 0.817 and statistically signicantly at the 1% signicance level.
The fact that the ination tax a¤ects the Gini coe¢ cient of the EA net wealth distribution
in the same direction as a progressive net wealth tax may appear surprising. The existing theo-
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retical literature, e.g., Erosa and Ventura (2002), typically emphasizes the regressive nature of
the ination tax when restricting consideration to nominal balances held for transaction pur-
poses. Our results show that this fails to be the case when considering the e¤ects of unexpected
ination for the real value of nominal claims and liabilities more generally.
The last column in table 6 reports the proportional net wealth tax (in percentage points)
that raises the same amount of government revenue as implied by the 10% surprise increase
in the price level.31 It shows that the revenue equivalent wealth tax is much smaller than the
ination tax.32 This is obtained, even though the wealth tax applies to domestic HHs, i.e.,
unlike the ination tax, falls short of taxing foreign wealth and emerges because HH net wealth
comprises a comparatively large amount of real assets, which remains untaxed with an ination
tax.
Gini Gini  Gini Rev.-equivalent
pre ination post ination (%) wealth tax (%)
Euro Area 0.652 0.650 -0.30 1.64
Austria 0.732 0.733 +0.21 1.70
Belgium 0.598 0.591 -1.21 1.80
Cyprus 0.685 0.682 -0.40 0.41
Finland 0.602 0.596 -1.02 0.37
France 0.664 0.661 -0.47 2.10
Germany 0.719 0.720 +0.04 1.73
Greece 0.546 0.544 -0.46 4.08
Italy 0.601 0.600 -0.13 2.09
Luxembourg 0.641 0.636 -0.70 -0.78
Malta 0.593 0.593 +0.02 0.64
Netherlands 0.545 0.537 -1.44 2.02
Portugal 0.658 0.654 -0.46 2.29
Slovakia 0.439 0.438 -0.28 1.64
Slovenia 0.525 0.523 -0.29 1.42
Spain 0.561 0.558 -0.52 1.11
Table 6: E¤ects on NW inequality (10% price level increase)
6 Ination Exposure and Ination Experience
This section documents that the cross-sectional distribution of HH ination exposures, reported
previously in gure 1, covaries in interesting ways with past ination experience. To document
31We assume that HHs with a positive NW position are taxed, but that HHs with a negative NW position are
not subsidized when levying the wealth tax.
32 It is even negative for the case of Luxembourg, where the government holds a positive net nominal position,
see table 1. The caveats expressed in section 3 apply to this result.
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Figure 2: Ination Exposures of all HHs (CDF over NNP/NW)
this relationship, we rank all EA countries according to the average HICP ination rate ex-
perienced since inception of the EA and then form three equally sized country groups: a high
ination group, a middle ination group, and a low ination group.3334
Figure 2 depicts the cumulative density functions (CDFs) for HH ination exposures (NNP/NW,
on the x-axis) for all three country groups.35 The gure shows that the CDF in high ination
countries rst order stochastically dominates the CDFs of the other groups, illustrating that
HHs in high ination countries have lower ination exposure. A similar, albeit less clear picture
emerges when comparing the middle ination group to the low ination group. The CDFs are
similar for negative NNP positions, but HHs in the low ination group hold a slightly more
negative ination exposure, despite ination being lower than in the middle ination group.
As we shall argue below, this may have to do with di¤erential access to credit in the low and
middle ination groups, as a negative NNP position can only be achieved by borrowing. Despite
this fact, the CDF for the middle ination group dominates that for the low ination group
when ination exposure is positive. Indeed, for the middle ination group ination exposures
are much more heavily concentrated at zero. This shows that in low ination countries, HHs
are less concerned about holding large part of net wealth in nominal assets, when compared to
middle or high ination EA countries.
Figure 3 depicts the CDF for the subpopulation of house owners that hold a mortgage. This
group has - by denition - access to credit. The gure shows that the CDF of high ination
33Each group comprises 5 countries; the high ination group consists of Greece, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia
and Spain; the middle ination group comprises Cyprus, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta and the Netherlands; the low
ination group is composed of Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finnland and France.
34Forming instead ve groups that comprise three countries each, delivers very similar results. Similarly, using
average ination rates that extend further back, say to 1990, leads to very similar outcomes.
35 In line with the results reported in gure 1, we exclude HHs with a negative NW from the analysis, due to
the discontinuity that negative NW creates for the ination exposure measure (NNP/NW). We also cut-o¤ the
distribution below -1 to exclude HHs with NW very close to zero.
24
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
-1 -.5 0 .5 1
High p countries
Middle p countries
Low p countries
Figure 3: Ination Exposure, Homeowners with Mortgage (CDF over NNP/NW)
countries stochastically dominates that of middle ination countries, which in turn stochastically
dominates that of low ination countries. Past ination rates thus strongly correlate with
ination exposures, with higher ination rates being associated with more borrowing and less
accumulation of nominal claims.36
Table 7 provides further evidence for individual countries and various HH subpopulations.
The table reports the outcome of regressing HHs ination exposure (NNP/NW) on log net
worth (NW), thus illustrates the marginal e¤ects of NW on ination exposure in the cross-
section.37 The estimates are provided for outright homeowners (second column), homeowners
with a mortgage (third column), renting HHs (forth column) and for all HHs jointly (last
column). The table shows that for outright owners there exists a weak positive cross-sectional
tendency to increase ination exposure as NW increases. This tendency is very strong for
owners holding a mortgage, presumably because repayment of mortgages is a key channel of
NW accumulation for these HHs. For renters, however, there is a tendency to reduce ination
exposure as NW increases.
The second to last row in table 7 reports the Spearman rank correlation between the reported
estimates and the countrys HICP ination experience since inception of the EA. It shows that
the rank correlation is negative and statistically signicant, except for the case of homeowners
with a mortgage, where the correlation turns out to be insignicant at conventional signicant
levels. These results highlight that there again exists a systematic relationship between past
ination experience and the cross sectional distribution of NNPs: HHs in high ination countries
36Appendix C reports the CDFs for the remaining subgroups (outright homeowners without a mortgage and
renters). Similar ndings regarding the relative ordering across ination groups can be observed for these sub-
populations.
37As with gure 1, we only consider HHs with positive NW and NNP/NW>-1. Each column of the table
reports the outcome of a pooled regression of NNP/NW on a constant, the interaction between a country dummy
and log NW, and a number of HH control variables (log HH income, education dummies and age group dummies).
The coe¢ cient reported in table 7 is the one pertaining to the interaction between the country dummy and log
NW.
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are in the cross-section less likely to increase ination exposures as NW increases (renting HHs
tend to decrease ination exposures faster as NW increases in high ination EA countries).
Understanding further the economic forces creating the systematic relationship between
HHsination exposures and ination experience appears to be of considerable interest, but is
beyond the scope of the present paper
Outright Homeowners Renters All
homeowners with mortgage HHs
Austria 0.012*** 0.182*** -0.020*** -0.091***
Belgium 0.018*** 0.187*** -0.016*** -0.091***
Cyprus 0.005 0.168*** -0.054*** -0.106***
Finland 0.010*** 0.176*** -0.030*** -0.098***
France 0.006 0.175*** -0.046*** -0.108***
Germany 0.017*** 0.182*** -0.013*** -0.087***
Greece 0.006 0.174*** -0.058*** -0.112***
Italy 0.009** 0.173*** -0.042*** -0.100***
Luxembourg 0.009** 0.168*** -0.030*** -0.096***
Malta 0.015*** 0.185*** -0.015*** -0.09***
Netherlands 0.017*** 0.175*** -0.004 -0.091***
Portugal 0.011*** 0.178*** -0.033*** -0.107***
Slovakia 0.013*** 0.191*** -0.024*** -0.109***
Slovenia 0.007* 0.192*** -0.046*** -0.109***
Spain 0.009** 0.174*** -0.031*** -0.109***
*/**/*** indicates signicance at 10%/5%/1% level
Spearman rank correlation with HICP ination
correlation -0.45 0.13 -0.55 -0.60
p-value 0.09 0.66 0.04 0.02
Table 7: NNP elasticity w.r.t. NW and ination experience
7 Conclusions and Outlook
We document that quantitatively important redistributive e¤ects are associated with unex-
pected price level movements in the Euro area (EA). While the EA as whole is a sizable net
winner of unexpected ination, these gains are unevenly distributed across countries, with some
countries winning well above average and others even losing in net terms. The gains are also
unevenly distributed across the household (HH) and government sectors, with the former typi-
cally being a loser and the latter being a winner of price level increases. Within the HH sector,
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gains and losses are also fairly unevenly distributed: rich older HHs turn out to be the largest
losers and young middle class HHs the largest winners of unexpected ination.
Since risk averse households dislike wealth redistribution risk, the present ndings highlight
that achieving price stability in the EA can contribute in important ways to HH welfare.
Overall, the heterogeneity of HHsination exposure across EA countries, documented in
the present study, highlights the need to understand further what motivates HHs to choose
certain net nominal positions. Why are HHs in some countries, say rich older HHs in Belgium,
so much more exposed to ination than their counterpart in Spain, which hold virtually no
ination exposure? Understanding these and related questions appears important and requires
additional structural modeling e¤orts.
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A Integrating Survey Data and Financial Accounts
We compute NNPs in the EAA using the following nancial variables (variable names and
variable codes are as dened in ESA95(1995)): Currency and deposits (F2), Short-term debt
securities (F331) Long-term debt securities (F332), Short-term loans (F41), Long-term loans
(F42), Quoted shares (F511), Unquoted shares and other equity (F51M), Mutual funds shares
(F52), Net equity of households in life insurance reserves and in pension funds reserves (F61),
Prepayments of insurance premiums and reserves for outstanding claims (F62), Other accounts
receivable and nancial derivatives (F7+F34). We derive the DNP of a sector using all of these
variable, except for F511, F51M and F52. The INP of a sector is computed using the DNP
of the rm sector and as described in section 2.5 and the ownership information contained in
F511, F51M and F52. The sector NNP is then simply the sum of the sectors INP and DNP.
When integrating HFCS data into EAA data, we construct from the HFCS data the positions
that correspond to those appearing in the EAA, essentially following the suggestions made in
Honkkila and Kavonius (2012). On the asset side we proceeded as follows:
Currency and deposits (F2): corresponds to Deposits (DA2101) in the HFCS plus
imputed currency. Currency has to be imputed in the HFCS, as information on it is not
available. For this purpose we distribute the aggregate stock of currency (F21) recorded in the
HH sector of the EAA to HHs in the HFCS proportionally to their deposit holdings.
Short-term debt securities (F331) and Long-term debt securities (F332): corre-
spond to Bonds(DA2103). Since no maturity information is available in the HFCS and since
according to the EAA F331 amounts to only 0.1% of F332 in the HH sector of the EA, we
attribute all of DA2103 to F332 and the set the HFCS counterpart of F331 to zero.
Short-term loans (F41) and Long-term loans (F42): corresponds to Amount owned
to households(DA2107) in the HFCS.
Quoted Shares (F511): corresponds to Shares, publicly traded(DA2105) in the HFCS.
Unquoted Shares and other equity (F51M): corresponds in the HFCS to Net wealth in
businesses, non-self-employment and not publicly traded(DA2104) plus Self-employed business
wealth (DA1140), unless it is a sole proprietorship. Sole proprietorships are not included
because the national account statistics record these assets as real assets of the HH sector instead
of recording them in the rm sector.
Mutual Fund Shares (F52): corresponds to ´Mutual funds, total(DA2102).
Net equity of households in life insurance reserves and in pension funds reserves
(F61): corresponds in the HFCS to the sum of Public or social security account with account
balance(PF0510), Occupational pension plans with account balance(PF0710), and Voluntary
Pension/whole life insurance schemes(DA2109).38
38Honkkila and Kavonius (2012) and Kavonius and Törmälehto (2010) explain that in the national accounts
F61 contains dened contribution pension plans and individual dened benet plans because the EAA covers
only the funded system. As stated in HFCN (2008) the HFCS pension wealth variables PF0510, PF0710, and
DA2109 also only includes funded plans, i.e., the value of individual pension plans and the value of all dened
contribution occupational plans.
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Prepayments of insurance premiums and reserves for outstanding claims (F62):
since there exists no HFCS counterpart to this variable, we assign a zero value to it in the
HFCS. Quantitatively, F62 amounts to 6% of F61 in the EAA for the EA as a whole.
Other accounts receivable and nancial derivatives (F7+F34): corresponds to Other
nancial assets(DA2108) in the HFCS.
The HFCS variable Managed accounts(DA2106) has no single conceptual counterpart in
the EAA, as the EAA does not distinguish whether or not an investment account is self-managed
or not. We deal with this by distributing DA2106 to the HFCS variables DA2101, DA2102,
DA2105 (the counterparts of F51M) and DA2108 proportionally before applying the matching
scheme described above. We do so to capture the fact that managed accounts typically comprise
assets from these asset categories.
On the liability side we apply the following scheme:
Loans, short-term (F41) and Loans, long-term (F42): corresponds in the HFCS to
the sum of Mortgages or loans using household main residence as collateral (HB170$x and
HB2100), Mortgages or loans using other properties as collateral (HB370$x and HB4100),
Non-collateralised loans(HC080$x and HC1100), Outstanding credit line/overdraft balance
(HC0220), Outstanding credit cards balance(HC0320).
Derivatives (F34): we assign a zero here, as the HFCS value is included on the asset side
(HFCS counterpart to F7+F34). The national accounts, assign - by convention - derivative
values to the liability side, recording a negative value, if required. The latter does not a¤ect
results as we are interested in net values only.
Net equity of households in life insurance reserves and in pension fund reserves
(F61): in the EAA this covers the pension commitment of small enterprises in Italy, which are
classied into the HH sector in Italian EAA. The HFCS does not provide information on this
item and we set it to zero. In Italy F61 amounts to about 3.5% of total HH sector liabilities.
Other accounts receivable/payable (F7): there exists no counterpart to this in the
HFCS so that we set it to zero.
A further issue with integrating HFCS data into EAA data arises because the HH sector in
the EAA includes all households and non-prot institutions serving households (NPISH), e.g.,
churches, political parties, and non-prot universities, while the HFCS only covers households
in the narrow sense and also excludes some households, e.g., elderly living in institutionalized
households. When aggregating HFCS data to obtain HH sector aggregates we adjust the aggre-
gates by the NPISH item-specic shares provided by Honkkila and Kavonius (2012) to obtain
EAA counterparts. We also adjust for population coverage using the numbers provided by the
same authors.
B Household Characteristics Across the NNP/NW Distribu-
tion: Country Level Information
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Table A1: Ination Exposure and HH Characteristics
Median Mean Share of Median Median # of HH
Age Edu Homeowners Income Wealth HHs share
(thou e) (thou e) (mill)
Austria
All households 51 3.1 48% 32.2 86.9 3.7 100%
Negative net worth 42 2.9 11% 24.0 -6.6 0.2 6%
Borrower 42 3.2 73% 43.5 144.2 0.3 9%
Almost no exposure 56 3.0 86% 33.8 252.4 0.6 16%
Pred. real assets 55 3.2 67% 37.2 186.6 1.3 36%
Pred. nominal assets 49 3.2 7% 31.7 33.7 0.6 17%
Almost only nom. assets 50 3.0 0% 18.8 5.0 0.5 15%
Belgium
All households 52 3.4 69% 33.5 226.3 4.4 100%
Negative net worth 40 3.2 4% 17.7 -1.4 0.2 4%
Borrower 41 3.7 91% 47.6 173.5 0.6 14%
Almost no exposure 58 2.9 88% 25.6 232.9 0.7 15%
Pred. real assets 57 3.5 89% 41.0 361.6 1.9 42%
Pred. nominal assets 50 3.5 38% 33.5 67.6 0.7 15%
Almost only nom. assets 39 3.0 0% 15.0 3.4 0.4 10%
Cyprus
All households 51 3.2 76% 32.2 289.2 0.3 100%
Negative net worth 52 2.2 12% 10.8 -0.3 0.0 6%
Borrower 43 3.8 87% 38.1 297.7 0.1 31%
Almost no exposure 56 2.9 87% 27.3 367.7 0.1 32%
Pred. real assets 53 3.3 83% 33.0 386.5 0.1 24%
Pred. nominal assets 55 3.4 16% 32.2 57.2 0.0 6%
Almost only nom. assets 80 1.5 0% 10.5 15.5 0.0 2%
Finland
All households 53 3.3 67% 34.6 105.5 2.3 100%
Negative net worth 31 3.5 36% 34.0 -7.4 0.3 12%
Borrower 46 3.7 90% 54.1 151.0 0.5 21%
Almost no exposure 61 3.3 88% 35.0 188.0 0.5 23%
Pred. real assets 61 3.3 79% 34.0 163.1 0.6 28%
Pred. nominal assets 49 3.2 17% 29.2 14.7 0.1 5%
Almost only nom. assets 50 2.9 2% 16.3 1.3 0.2 11%
France
Continued on next page
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Table A1 continued from previous page
Median Mean Share of Median Median # of HH
Age Edu Homeowners Income Wealth HHs share
(thou e) (thou e) (mill)
All households 53 2.7 54% 28.7 132.3 26.3 100%
Negative net worth 39 2.7 5% 26.1 -4.5 1.0 4%
Borrower 42 3.3 82% 39.3 172.5 4.1 16%
Almost no exposure 59 2.4 82% 28.0 228.6 4.9 19%
Pred. real assets 58 2.7 64% 29.8 207.7 9.9 38%
Pred. nominal assets 47 2.6 8% 22.6 10.6 4.7 18%
Almost only nom. assets 48 2.7 0% 21.4 19.5 1.6 6%
Germany
All households 52 3.5 43% 32.0 61.5 37.7 100%
Negative net worth 43 3.0 8% 17.2 -2.3 3.4 9%
Borrower 47 3.7 87% 48.8 145.2 4.1 11%
Almost no exposure 56 3.4 81% 34.4 207.3 2.7 7%
Pred. real assets 58 3.6 73% 40.0 213.7 13.0 35%
Pred. nominal assets 46 3.6 10% 34.2 41.5 8.1 21%
Almost only nom. assets 52 3.1 0% 17.2 6.2 6.4 17%
Greece
All households 54 2.6 72% 21.9 105.2 3.9 100%
Negative net worth 40 2.5 4% 13.3 0.0 0.2 6%
Borrower 47 2.9 83% 29.0 130.0 0.7 18%
Almost no exposure 57 2.3 87% 19.5 120.8 1.8 45%
Pred. real assets 55 2.9 73% 25.5 122.0 1.0 24%
Pred. nominal assets 43 3.1 16% 27.9 16.9 0.1 3%
Almost only nom. assets 30 2.9 0% 10.1 1.0 0.2 4%
Italy
All households 55 2.4 69% 26.2 182.2 23.3 100%
Negative net worth 48 2.0 1% 11.8 -0.3 0.6 3%
Borrower 45 2.9 86% 37.7 180.0 2.0 8%
Almost no exposure 58 2.3 81% 21.7 209.9 8.3 36%
Pred. real assets 57 2.6 76% 32.0 223.9 9.8 42%
Pred. nominal assets 52 2.4 5% 22.2 20.1 2.2 9%
Almost only nom. assets 63 2.1 0% 15.5 6.7 0.4 2%
Luxembourg
All households 50 2.9 66% 65.0 447.9 0.2 100%
Negative net worth 41 2.1 10% 38.5 -11.9 0.0 4%
Continued on next page
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Table A1 continued from previous page
Median Mean Share of Median Median # of HH
Age Edu Homeowners Income Wealth HHs share
(thou e) (thou e) (mill)
Borrower 44 3.1 85% 74.1 380.5 0.0 19%
Almost no exposure 58 2.6 86% 62.0 567.3 0.0 24%
Pred. real assets 56 3.1 76% 79.0 644.7 0.1 36%
Pred. nominal assets 40 3.3 11% 51.5 64.9 0.0 11%
Almost only nom. assets 45 2.5 0% 23.0 4.8 0.0 5%
Malta
All households - 2.4 78% 21.5 222.0 0.1 100%
Negative net worth - 1.6 0% 9.1 0.0 0.0 2%
Borrower - 2.9 95% 30.0 162.1 0.0 7%
Almost no exposure - 2.4 94% 17.4 233.4 0.0 19%
Pred. real assets - 2.5 92% 24.6 292.9 0.1 56%
Pred. nominal assets - 2.3 20% 20.8 35.3 0.0 10%
Almost only nom. assets - 2.0 0% 10.2 37.0 0.0 6%
Netherlands
All households 52 3.3 52% 39.5 128.3 6.5 100%
Negative net worth 36 3.8 38% 42.9 -24.5 0.9 13%
Borrower 50 3.4 95% 46.4 196.5 1.4 21%
Almost no exposure 57 3.1 85% 37.5 262.8 0.5 7%
Pred. real assets 57 3.3 79% 44.1 329.0 1.6 25%
Pred. nominal assets 58 3.1 6% 34.7 46.9 1.3 20%
Almost only nom. assets 51 2.9 0% 30.5 51.6 0.8 13%
Portugal
All households 55 1.8 70% 14.4 81.6 3.7 100%
Negative net worth 46 1.4 14% 9.4 -0.5 0.2 5%
Borrower 44 2.4 92% 20.0 114.6 0.6 17%
Almost no exposure 60 1.5 91% 12.2 100.3 1.1 30%
Pred. real assets 58 1.9 76% 16.1 106.3 1.2 33%
Pred. nominal assets 53 1.8 25% 14.0 23.5 0.2 7%
Almost only nom. assets 60 1.4 0% 9.0 1.1 0.3 9%
Slovakia
All households 50 3.2 90% 11.2 64.3 1.9 100%
Negative net worth 45 2.9 14% 5.5 -0.5 0.0 1%
Borrower 42 3.4 96% 12.8 56.0 0.1 8%
Almost no exposure 55 3.1 99% 10.2 68.7 0.8 43%
Continued on next page
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Table A1 continued from previous page
Median Mean Share of Median Median # of HH
Age Edu Homeowners Income Wealth HHs share
(thou e) (thou e) (mill)
Pred. real assets 51 3.4 94% 13.0 71.2 0.8 40%
Pred. nominal assets 41 3.5 46% 15.5 30.2 0.1 4%
Almost only nom. assets 40 3.1 0% 7.0 1.1 0.1 3%
Slovenia
All households 53 3.2 82% 17.7 104.1 0.8 100%
Negative net worth 47 2.2 0% 8.5 0.0 0.0 4%
Borrower 50 3.3 91% 22.9 78.9 0.1 13%
Almost no exposure 55 3.0 93% 13.8 134.5 0.4 53%
Pred. real assets 53 3.6 86% 24.2 142.9 0.2 24%
Pred. nominal assets 39 3.6 16% 29.5 10.7 0.0 6%
Almost only nom. assets 58 2.3 0% 9.5 5.9 0.0 2%
Spain
All households 52 2.6 83% 24.2 194.4 16.0 100%
Negative net worth 38 2.4 23% 23.0 -6.2 0.7 4%
Borrower 44 3.1 90% 29.3 201.9 4.3 27%
Almost no exposure 58 2.2 95% 19.7 206.7 5.7 36%
Pred. real assets 58 2.7 85% 27.5 256.0 4.1 26%
Pred. nominal assets 47 3.1 30% 23.7 39.4 0.5 3%
Almost only nom. assets 47 2.3 0% 12.2 1.3 0.6 4%
Median age is unavailable for Malta where age information is coded using age bracket informa-
tion only.
C Ination Experience and Ination Exposure: Further Details
Figure 4 redraws gure 2 for the subpopulation of outright homeowners that do not hold a
mortgage; it conrms the ndings reported in gure 2 for the overall population. Figure 5
depicts the outcomes for the subpopulation of renters (who do not own a house). It shows that
the for the middle ination group of countries there is relatively large jump around zero, which
may again be the due to credit restrictions.
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Figure 4: Ination Exposure, Outright Homeowners (CDF over NNP/NW)
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Figure 5: Ination Exposure, Renters (CDF over NNP/NW)
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